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Embassy cinema: What Wikileaks reveals about US state support for 
Hollywood 
 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, several detractors sought to distinguish, in 
the words of former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich, 
‘real Americans’ from ‘celluloid Americans’ (Gingrich and Schweizer, 2003), 
arguing that the attacks on the World Trade Center were emblematic of a 
reaction to the pervasive Hollywood construct of America. Yet despite these 
reservations, Hollywood’s relationship with Washington has, in recent decades, 
strengthened to such a degree that the epithet ‘Washwood’ is now frequently 
used to describe the industry (Lewis et al, 2002: 130), which, it is argued, 
regularly functions as a tub-thumper for the American military industrial complex. 
While there have been a number of significant recent studies that place this 
relationship in a fuller socioeconomic context (Robb, 2004; Miller et al, 2007; 
Kellner 2010; Jenkins 2012; Jenkins & Alford, 2012), the importance of the global 
network of US embassies in this system, and their role in Hollywood’s cultural 
hegemony, is often overlooked. Until recently, this involvement has been 
examined only in a handful of articles, which focus on the years immediately 
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following the Second World War (Jarvie, 1990; Swann, 1991; Trumpbour, 2007; 
Lee, 2008; Colman, 2009). Yet the release by Wikileaks in 2011 of a tranche of 
over 250,000 US embassy cables has provided an opportunity to explore how 
this process operates in the 21st-century. 
 
Using these documents, this article will explore the role of American embassies 
in global film policy from 2003-2010, and examine how the US State Department 
sought to use Hollywood to support American foreign policy aims. In so doing, I 
argue that not only does Hollywood rely on the network of US embassies to 
extend and maintain its global dominance, but also that at the turn of the century, 
it became a more important agent than it had ever been before in the wider 
pursuit of America’s international interests. After outlining a brief history of the 
interactions between US embassies and Hollywood, the article will explore how 
from 2001 onwards, the US State Department and its global network of 
embassies facilitated this gradual shift in the nature of Hollywood’s relationship 
with Washington, and will assess the implications of this development for 
conceptions of the nature of American power. 
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A brief history of US embassy involvement in Hollywood 
As early as 1916, US embassies were reporting to the State Department on the 
opportunities for American movies in the world film market, with the advent of the 
First World War realizing Hollywood’s global importance in terms of both its 
economic and political impact. This information would in turn be relayed to the 
Hollywood studios (Lee, 2008: 379), a practice that was part of a wider 
governmental strategy to establish Hollywood’s international dominance, which 
by the twenties was firmly established (Thompson, 1985). With its financial 
advantage confirmed, the Department of Commerce, led by Herbert Hoover, 
sought to capitalize on its cultural reach. Hoover had appointed Dr Julius Klein as 
head of the department’s Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (BFDC), 
which provided commercial attachés to US embassies, and by 1926 Klein had 
established a Motion Picture Section managed by Clarence Jackson North 
(Bjork, 2008: 577). It was North who was to further embed the work of the 
department with America’s global embassies, operating as a conduit between the 
consulates and Hollywood’s commercial interests. North received regular reports 
from the Department of Commerce’s attachés, asking them to ‘report changes in 
overseas demand that could be attributed to motion pictures’ (Trumpbour, 2007: 
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64), and while these activities were in essence fairly inconsequential monitoring 
of international business, they laid the foundations for more significant 
interventions during the Second World War. 
 
By 1942 Roosevelt had established the Office of Wartime Information, which 
soon began taking an interest in Hollywood productions, primarily as a state 
censor (Nye 2008: 98), but by 1944 a US State Department memorandum, 
‘American Motion Pictures in the Post-War World’, marked a shift towards a more 
proactive approach to Hollywood. The document urged foreign ambassadors to 
provide advice and assistance to the Hollywood studios, asserting that the State 
Department ‘desires to cooperate fully in the protection of the American motion 
picture industry abroad’ (Jarvie, 1990: 280). In return, the memo’s author, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Adolf A Berle Jr, 
requested that ‘the industry will cooperate wholeheartedly with the government 
with a view to ensuring that the pictures distributed abroad will reflect credit on 
the good name and reputation of this country and its institutions’ (Trumpbour, 
2007: 89).  
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Berle’s edict marked a major ideological shift in Hollywood’s relationship with the 
US government after the Second World War, by presenting the primary 
importance of American film exports as their ability to create goodwill towards 
America, with their depictions of in vogue notions of democracy and anti-
communism (Jarvie, 1990: 278). This change from the notion of film as merely a 
harbinger of commerce to the enhanced status of that of a cultural ambassador, 
was prompted by the tenure of Eric Johnston as the head of the Motion Picture 
Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA) trade body, who had replaced 
Will Hays in 1945. The 'Hays Office' had already created a 'Foreign Division', 
which was its official conduit to the State Department and the Bureau of Foreign 
and Domestic Commerce (de Grazia, 2005: 299), but Johnston immediately 
rebranded the organization as the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) 
and formed the Motion Picture Export Association (MPEA) as the department 
responsible for representing Hollywood abroad. Johnston was President of the 
US Chamber of Commerce, and his links with the State Department often gave 
the impression to other countries that his position in negotiations had government 
approval (Swann, 1991: 4). This perception was not entirely without justification; 
while the MPAA’s former incarnation was close to the US government, under 
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Johnston’s leadership this relationship became even more pronounced, and it 
became an increasingly powerful industry body that lobbied aggressively on 
behalf of the Hollywood studios, so much so that it earned the moniker ‘the little 
State Department’ (Lee, 2008: 376). 
 
The most detailed study of the influence of Johnston’s MPAA is Jonathan 
Colman’s analysis of the London embassy’s negotiations over British film policy 
during 1947-1948 (2009). Colman argues that the embassy’s intervention was 
instrumental in the reduction of controls imposed by Britain on foreign film 
imports, which threatened a number of other reciprocal economic benefits. In 
fact, the embassy believed that this issue had the potential to destabilize the 
impending ‘Marshall Plan’i itself, with Hollywood poised to launch a wave of anti-
British propaganda should the export of its films to the British market be restricted 
further. Johnston personally negotiated on behalf of the MPAA with Don Bliss, 
Commercial Attaché at the London embassy, and Bliss’s remonstrations to the 
British Board of Trade resulted in an agreement on a screen time quota and 
removal of the distributors’ quota from the upcoming 1948 Cinematograph Films 
Act (Jarvie, 1990: 281). As Colman concludes, ‘it is clear that the US Embassy 
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had a positive role...[It] was sensitive to wider foreign policy issues as well as 
knowledgeable about the complexities of the film trade, and kept Washington 
informed’ (Colman, 2009: 426). Colman regards the embassy’s intervention as 
one of reasoned broker, mitigating the more aggressive free-market posturing of 
the Hollywood studios and the staunchly protectionist goals of the British 
government, and this moment has, until now, been regarded as one of the last 
times that a US embassy exerted any significant influence over international film 
policy. 
 
Despite a few sporadic examples of individual ambassadors making personal 
interventions since the 1950s (such as Clare Booth Luce, Ambassador to Italy, 
threatening to withdraw from the judging panel of the Venice Film Festival after 
taking offence at the depiction of the US school system in its planned screening 
of The Blackboard Jungle (Richard Brooks, US, 1955)), as Paul Swann argues, 
‘most US Embassy reports...dating from the 1950s might be characterized as 
“damage control” assessments’ (Swann, 1991: 14), with hardly any evidence of 
direct involvement. Yet the cables released by Wikileaks in 2010 demonstrate 
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that, at least during the first decade of the 21st-century, embassy collusion with 
Hollywood was even more prevalent than during the 1940s.  
 
 
American power and its development in the wake of the ‘War on Terror’ 
Joseph Nye offers one explanation as to why the embassy records depict only a 
handful of interventions after the Second World War. In his Bound to Lead, Nye 
argues that the Cold War resulted in the development of a new expression of 
power, one that differed from traditional military and diplomatic channels and 
which instead was represented by ‘the ability to get what one wants through 
persuasion or attraction rather than coercion’ (Wilson, 2008: 114). This was a 
‘soft power’ that was nebulous and embedded within less tangible concepts, 
ideas and culture, and crucially, could indirectly co-opt various parties into 
supporting US policies, by the appeal of the values that underpinned them and 
the American way of life more broadly. In this reading, the activities of US 
embassies did not need to be as directly pursued as in the post-Second World 
War period, as the soft power impact of America’s post-war economic support of 
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Western Europe, coupled with the public appeal of its affluent consumerism, 
ensured that its influence on international affairs was potent and widespread. 
 
The ubiquity of American soft power since the Second World War has led some 
commentators to argue that it has established a de facto ‘imperialist’ project, with 
Victoria de Grazia arguing that the US 
 
offered a model of informal empire, with its outright colonial 
adventures aberrant, circumscribed, and generally short-lived. In 
post-World II [sic] western Europe, to the degree that US power 
has been characterized as imperial, it has been to distinguish its 
light touch as befitting an “empire by invitation,” an “empire by 
consensus,” or an “empire of fun” (de Grazia, 2005: 6). 
 
De Grazia's preferred term for this form of American post-war power is ‘market 
empire’, the roots of which she traces back to Woodrow Wilson (de Grazia, 2005: 
3) and which, fundamentally, involves regarding 'other nations as having limited 
sovereignty over their public space’ – a concept that posits American commercial 
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interests imposing themselves on foreign markets under the auspices of free 
trade, reasoning that the population would benefit 'not just from the traffic of 
goods, but also from the principles embedded in them' (de Grazia, 2005: 6). The 
example of Hollywood was a case in point: 'its promotion would stimulate not only 
more trade, but also a lively local market in new identities and pleasures’ (de 
Grazia, 2005: 6). 
 
By 2001, George W Bush’s administration, and especially its self-proclaimed 
‘War on Terror’, cemented the long-term interdependence of the 'market 
empire's' soft power with a number of ‘hard’ power military offensives, most 
notably in the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Despite these 
wars following a long line of post-Second World War American military 
interventions, there was a general agreement amongst critics that Bush’s foreign 
policy marked a decisive shift in American strategy towards a more traditionally 
‘hard power’ approach, to the detriment of America’s international standing. This 
transition has led scholars such as Hurrell (2005) and Agnew (2005) to describe 
American power in terms of 'hegemony', rather than empire, which Grondin 
argues 'has the capacity to encompass both the Gramscian concept of 
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consensus and persuasion as well as the classical view that highlights the role of 
military power and coercion in the evolution of US foreign policy' (Grondin, 2006: 
1-2).). As Dalby (2006) identifies, this approach becomes more persuasive in the 
wake of the Bush administration’s response to the attacks on the World Trade 
Center, which was presented in 2002 as part of the ‘National Security Strategy of 
the United States of America’ (NSS) and effectively acted as a ‘codification of the 
“Bush doctrine”' (Dalby, 2006: 42). The NSS and the subsequent National Military 
Strategy (NMS) in 2004, asserted ‘preemptive action against “rogue states” and 
threats to the US’ (Dalby, 2006: 43) and stated that ‘US military power must be 
ready to serve at any time if it is to have an impact’ (Grondin, 2006: 16). 
 
One of the fiercest critics of the ‘Bush doctrine’, the former lead US 
representative to the UN General Assembly Suzanne Nossel, summed up the 
prevailing mood in Foreign Affairs in 2004, in which she argued, ‘September 11 
transformed Bush's foreign policy. Channeling outrage over the attacks, the 
administration shifted from a detached to a defiant unilateralism. Bush adopted 
an evangelical, militarist agenda’ (Nossel, 2004: 134). In Nossel’s analysis, this 
shift in focus towards a hard power approach was fruitless, and had led to the US 
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being ‘seen as an oppressor, hungry for oil and power’ (Nossel, 2004: 134), and 
several critics started to lament the decline of America’s soft power as a result. 
Authors such as Nye and Kurlantzick have identified the roots of this 
retrenchment in the preceding Clinton administration, in which a gradual shift 
from funding soft power initiatives (from reducing the budget of the United States 
Information Agency through to the failure to arrest a decline in listeners to the 
Voice of America) first began (Kurlantzick, 2006: 420). In Kurlantzick’s analysis, 
the crisis had become self-propagating, with the decline in spending and interest 
in public diplomacy (itself due partly to an overconfident belief in the permanence 
and international dominance of America’s soft power) leading to a relative 
deterioration in America’s influence, which in turn had forced the Bush 
administration to resort to hard power alternatives, as it was unable to achieve its 
foreign policy aims via diplomatic means (Kurlantzick, 2006: 423). In this context, 
the failure to achieve widespread international agreement on action against Iraq 
was an inevitable consequence of this atrophy, and in turn, the subsequent US-
led invasion generated further anti-American sentiment, leading to an even 
greater reduction in Americas’ international standing and once again serving to 
reinforce the primacy of America’s hard power policy options (Nye, 2004b: 255). 
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Kurlantzick and Nye believed that the this shift had to be halted in order to 
preserve America’s position in international relations, arguing that America’s 
success will ‘depend upon our developing a better balance of hard and soft 
power in our foreign policy’ (Nye, 2004b: 270), a concept that he and Nossel 
would label ‘smart power’.ii Nossel defined this alternative as ‘knowing that the 
United States' own hand is not always its best tool: U.S. interests are furthered 
by enlisting others on behalf of U.S. goals, through alliances, international 
institutions, careful diplomacy, and the power of ideals’ (Nossel, 2004: 134). By 
2007 Nye would become Co-Chair of The Center for Strategic and International 
Studies’ ‘Commission on Smart Power’, which argued for the US to implement a 
smart power strategy, by ‘once again investing in the global good’ and taking the 
lead in global development and public diplomacy (Armitage and Nye, 2007: 1). It 
echoed Nossel’s arguments by asserting that 
 
Washington is currently creating new sources of friction, turning 
friends into antagonists, damaging once-valuable policy tools, 
and impairing its own ability to harness the power of its citizenry, 
 14 
bureaucracy, and allies. It must reverse course and embrace a 
smarter, less draining brand of power guided by a compelling 
and coherent conception of national interest (Nossel, 2004: 134). 
 
Nossel and Nye’s rebranding of US foreign policy has been criticized (Lane, 
2008), yet it was extremely influential on State Department thinking in the final 
years of the Bush administration, and especially on how the subsequent Obama 
government conceptualized its foreign policy in public, with Hillary Clinton 
referring explicitly to the term in her confirmation hearing as US Secretary of 
State (Nye 2009: 160). Yet neither Nossel, nor the many authors to have 
discussed American power during this period, were to know that the State 
Department had been pursuing ‘smarter’ methods all along, using its extensive 
network of embassies throughout the duration of the Bush and Obama 
administrations to provide a link between the government’s ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power 
initiatives. This data came to light in 2010 as part of the release by Wikileaks of a 
large tranche of American embassy cables, and these documents not only reveal 
the extent of the State Department’s collusion with Hollywood, but also they 
provide a unique insight into the nature of American power during this period. 
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The Wikileaks cables 
Initially, only a small selection of embassy cables relating to Icelandic politics 
were made public, primarily through major international news outlets, with the 
original copies hosted on Wikileak’s own website. However, it was the publication 
of 220 redacted cables via Wikileak’s media partners from 28 November 2010, 
that first began to detail the correspondence that had been sent to the US State 
Department from 274 consulates and embassies around the world. A steady 
stream of revelations followed each subsequent disclosure, but after numerous 
attacks on the Wikileaks site, and the publication of passcodes and decryption 
keys to the material that in principle made all of the unredacted cables available 
online, Wikileaks took the decision to release the full tranche of 251,287 cables 
on 1 September 2011. 
 
The website Cablegate (https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org) had by this point 
already created a searchable database of the 2000-plus redacted cables that had 
been released, and soon after Wikileaks uploaded the entire cache, Cablegate 
made all of these documents fully keyword searchable. I used the Cablegate 
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website for my researchiii, focusing on keywords such as ‘cinema’, ‘film’ and 
‘Hollywood’, amongst others, re-referencing key names if they appeared in any of 
these more generic searches. There is a vast amount of material – a search for 
‘Hollywood’, for example, retrieves 207 cables, and a search for ‘cinema’ 390. 
While some cables stretch back to 1966, the majority are from 2002 onwards, 
and while this is partly due to the limitations of the tranche released, the tone of 
the cables suggests that there was an increase in the frequency of documents 
referring to films and filmmaking in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Cables 
discussing cinema were sent from most major industrialized countries, to varying 
degrees. Cables from the Middle East and Australasia tended to focus on more 
cultural concerns, and were less frequent than the cables originating from South 
America and Europe, where economic issues, mainly regarding intellectual 
property rights (IPR), appeared to be more pressing. By far the greatest 
concentration of cables originated from Canada, which was roughly equally 
divided into cultural and economic matters. The close proximity of Canada to the 
US is one obvious reason as to why there was a greater number from this region, 
but the content also suggests that this focus on Canada was as much to do with 
the American belief that IPR violations were especially prevalent there. 
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Much of the material is of a mundane, prosaic nature, related to simple 
discussions of rumours relating to local film censorship, through to gossip about 
discussions with various foreign dignitaries and their cinematic tastes.iv By far the 
most commonly discussed issue was that of IPR, specifically those relating to 
copyright violations, or in the parlance of the US embassies, ‘piracy’. Many of the 
countries that were deemed to be persistent offenders were placed on the Office 
of the United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) ‘Special 301 Report’ list,v 
published annually to identify countries whose IPR enforcement (or more 
precisely, lack of enforcement) was perceived to harm US trade. Over 970 of the 
cables published by Wikileaks referred to the term ‘Special 301’, and several of 
these reports dealt directly with IPR relating to Hollywood. This article will not 
address the cables that deal with IPR violations, although reference to the sheer 
volume of these documents serves to provide a context for the use of Hollywood 
as a vehicle of America’s foreign policy in the period. Instead, I have focused on 
the material that directly addresses cultural concerns in areas of strategic 
importance to US international relations, as an indication of how American culture 
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in general, and Hollywood in particular, was employed by embassies to support 
America’s national interests.  
 
International perception and anti-Americanism 
Cables from the first few years following the 9/11 attacks often present what 
might be regarded as a ‘soft power’ approach, in response to a perceived 
increase in anti-Americanism after the start of the ‘War on Terror’. This is in line 
with the appointment of Charlotte Beers, a former CEO of several high-profile 
advertising firms, to Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs at the 
State Department in October 2001. Beer’s objective, supported by $15 million of 
government funding, ‘was to take “market shares away from Jihad” by targeting 
“disaffected populations”, especially in the Middle East and South Asia, “where a 
poor perception of US (sic) leads to unrest, and unrest has proven to be a threat 
to our national and international security”’ (de Grazia, 2005: 474). In a cable from 
2005, Linda Jewell, the US Ambassador in Quito, Ecuador, provided a succinct 
summary of why film screenings were a vital element of these ‘cultural diplomacy’ 
measures, arguing that 
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[Cultural programs help] create a more receptive environment for 
the completion of Mission goals by deepening understanding of 
US society and exposing audiences to aspects of American 
culture that they perhaps had not experienced before...A well-
selected series of independent and less-commercialized US films 
would be a powerful way to refute misconceptions and 
stereotypes about the US (Wikileaks, 22 December 2005: 
05QUITO2920) 
 
The cables show that this approach was adopted widely across China. For 
example, the Shanghai consulate showed American films to university audiences 
across the country, followed by a discussion by an embassy official about 
American society and politics (Wikileaks, 22 June 2009: 09SHANGHAI271), and 
met with students at Nanjing University to discuss the release of Nanjing! 
Nanjing!/City of Life and Death (Lu Chuan, China, 2009), as part of a wider 
investigation into Sino-Japanese relations in the wake of the controversial film’s 
release. vi  In Beijing, the embassy’s Center for Educational Exchange ran a 
question and answer session with Chinese director Li Yang, after a screening of 
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his film Mang Shan/Blind Mountain (China, 2007) to 80 university students. The 
film covered the issue of human trafficking in China, and some of the audience 
criticized Yang for ‘showcasing China’s failings’, arguing that it was 
‘”embarrassing” for China to be “exposing” its problems to the world’ (Wikileaks, 
27 May 2009: 09BEIJING1404). However, several students were more positive 
about Yang’s critique, and the embassy took the opportunity to present the 
measures undertaken by the US to combat trafficking throughout the world 
(Wikileaks, 27 May 2009: 09BEIJING1404). Of course, these cultural programs 
have always been a consistent feature of embassy activity, but what is interesting 
from the Wikileaks cables is how often this activity was framed as a response to 
anti-American sentiment, which the embassies, acting on instructions from the 
State Department, were eager to dispel. Jewell, writing about her attempts to 
establish a cultural program in Ecuador’s universities, claimed that this was 
especially challenging because they contained ‘significant currents of anti-
Americanism [which made] policy-based programming difficult’ (Wikileaks, 22 
December 2005: 05QUITO2920), and it appears that universities were explicitly 
targeted as sites where anti-American views could be challenged. Jewell’s 
conclusion was not an isolated one; by 2003 Beers had resigned from her role, 
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and in her final testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee she argued 
that the ‘gap between who we are and how we wish to be seen, and how we are 
in fact seen, is frighteningly wide' (de Grazia, 2005: 475). 
 
One region that was perceived to be especially anti-American was Canada, and 
the extant cables depict a tense, fractious association between the two countries, 
and a Canadian government that sought to enhance the protection of its culture 
rather than erode it. These tensions increased in the early 21st-century, near the 
end of the final term of office for Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and in 
light of a government review into the cultural support for Canada’s film industry, 
Canadian Content in the 21st Century. Its recommendations sought to uphold the 
principle that ‘Canadian content can be created only by Canadians…The mere 
fact of being very largely created by Canadians is what gives an audiovisual work 
its unique Canadian identity’ (Wikileaks, 25 June 2003: 03OTTAWA1797). The 
report also recommended that the distribution of Canadian feature films in 
Canada be reserved for Canadian owned and controlled companies, as well as 
proposing a readjustment of the funding eligibility rules that would see minimum 
expenditure requirements applied to four key ‘creative costs’; authors, creative 
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collaborators, performers and technicians. Of additional concern to the US was 
the proposal that advertisements for Canadian feature films could be exempted 
from the country’s statutory twelve-minute-per-hour TV advertising limit, thus 
providing prominence to these productions over US films (Wikileaks, 25 June 
2003: 03OTTAWA1797). The assessment of the Ottawan Ambassador, Paul 
Celluci, in cables from the start of the decade, was that while opinion in Canada 
tended towards upholding these cultural protection measures, there were 
changes on the horizon, most notably the impending retirement of Prime Minister 
Chrétien, which suggested potential for a policy more favorable to the US in the 
future (Wikileaks, 25 June 2003: 03OTTAWA1797). 
 
However, the story told in the cables is one of increased antipathy towards the 
US and a strengthening of protectionist measures over the remainder of the 
decade. By 2005, US consulates were reporting on initiatives like the enhanced 
tax credit offered to filmmakers in Nova Scotia, from 30-35% within Halifax and 
35-40% for productions in areas 30km or more from the city centre, along with 
similar measures undertaken in Ontario in 2004, and British Columbia in 2005 
(Wikileaks, 18 April 2005: 05HALIFAX101). Likewise, within five years of Celluci’s 
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assessment, the Ottawan embassy would report that ‘Canadian content’ was 
rapidly becoming ‘anti-American’ content, arguing that the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) had, in its current season, presented ‘a number 
of programs [that] offer Canadian viewers their fill of nefarious American officials 
carrying out equally nefarious deeds in Canada while Canadian officials either 
oppose them or fail trying’ (Wikileaks, 25 January 2008: 08OTTAWA136). The 
cable, signed by Ambassador David Wilkins, suggested that 
 
the degree of comfort with which Canadian broadcast entities, 
including those financed by Canadian tax dollars, twist current 
events to feed long-standing negative images of the U.S. -- and 
the extent to which the Canadian public seems willing to indulge 
in the feast - is noteworthy as an indication of the kind of 
insidious negative popular stereotyping we are increasingly up 




Wilkins’ main concern was the new CBC show, The Border (CBC, 2008-2010), 
which premiered on 7 January 2008 and depicted the dilemmas faced by 
Canadian customs officers on the US-Canada border. However, the criticisms 
even extended to the sitcom, Little Mosque on the Prairie (CBC, 2007-2012), 
which also portrayed border relation problems, and the H2O (CBC, 2004) mini-
series which, after presenting a scenario where the US engineered Canadian 
citizens to vote in favor of becoming part of the US, featured a union between 
Canadians and Europeans in ‘an attempt to end America’s hegemony’ 
(Wikileaks, 25 January 2008: 08OTTAWA136). The cable concluded that ‘We 
need to do everything we can to make it more difficult for Canadians to fall into 
the trap of seeing all U.S. policies as the result of nefarious faceless US 
bureaucrats anxious to squeeze their northern neighbor’ (Wikileaks, 25 January 
2008: 08OTTAWA136), and while the Canadian cables demonstrate long held 
rivalries between the two nations, they also speak of America’s increasing 






These fears fuelled increasingly interventionist attempts to control the portrayal of 
the US throughout the globe from the middle of the decade onwards, in line with 
America’s increasingly expansive military endeavors. The earliest explicit 
example of this type of intervention is recorded in a cable from the Wellington 
Embassy in 2004, which outlines an account of direct US interference in a New 
Zealand Cabinet Minister’s fundraising event. In a partial extract of the original 
cable, it reported that Marian Hobbs, New Zealand Minister for the Environment, 
was due to host a screening of Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11 (US, 2004) as 
part of a Labor Party fundraiser. The Deputy Chief of Mission at the Wellington 
embassy, David Burnett, contacted the offices of both Prime Minister Helen Clark 
and Hobbs, and while he was declined a meeting with Hobbs, she withdrew from 
hosting the fundraiser shortly afterwards (Wikileaks, 30 July 2004: 
04WELLINTON647). The comment from the Ambassador, Charles Swindells, 
opined that ‘There’s a reason this particular Minister is nicknamed ‘Boo Boo’ 
Hobbs…it is probable that this potential fiasco may only have been averted 
because of our phone calls’, before explaining that he would use a scheduled 
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meeting with Clark, to ‘remind her that we would really rather not get dragged into 
internal NZ political issues’ (Wikileaks, 30 July 2004: 04WELLINTON647). 
 
As the decade developed, interventions also began to take the form of support 
for the expansion of Hollywood production and distribution into markets that had 
strategic international significance, such as Bulgaria. In January 2006, a cable 
from the Sofia embassy recounted the ongoing negotiations over the privatization 
of Bulgaria’s Boyana Film Studios. Dating from the 1950s, Boyana had been 
responsible for about 25 Bulgarian features per year, although after struggling in 
the early nineties it became mainly focused on servicing national television 
productions (Iordanova, 2007: 105). In addition, The American film company Nu 
Image had located the majority of its productions there since 1997, all of which 
had created a number of jobs for Bulgarians and provided a boost to the local 
economy. Despite this, by 2002 the Bulgarian government had instigated 
measures to privatize the studio, setting a valuation of 50 million Lev, roughly 
equivalent to 25 million Euros (Iordanova, 2007: 105). By the time bids had been 
invited in 2004, the asking price had dropped to only 5 million Euros, and four 
offers had been received, from the German Bavaria Film, the British Ealing 
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Studios, an international consortium called Dragon International, and finally, the 
American company with a strong historical connection to the studio, Nu Image 
(Iordanova, 2007: 105). Nu Image won the process with a bid of 6.25 million 
Euros for 95 per cent of the shares (Iordanova, 2007: 105), but despite its 
success, plans to sell the studios to the company were not popular, with the 
studio’s managing board firmly against the move and a number of Bulgarian 
filmmakers objecting to the low-budget action films that Nu Image was at that 
time associated with. Others questioned the criteria for the bidding process, 
arguing that the requirement to have produced over 100 films favoured 
companies like Nu Image, precisely because it had made such a large number of 
films at low cost (Roth, 2004). 
 
However, what these individuals did not know, was that a series of cables from 
the Sofia embassy pointed to the close involvement of official US representatives 
throughout the procedure, mounting sustained pressure to ensure that NuImage 
was successful. This is first documented in 2005, when Ambassador Beyrle met 
with Roumen Ovcharov, the new Bulgarian Minister of Economy and Energy, and 
‘rasied the need for Bulgaria to finalize the sale of Boyana film studios to 
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American film producer Nu Image’, with Ovcharov noting that the sale was 
‘currently tied up in the judicial system’ (Wikileaks, 15 September 2005: 
05SOFIA1597). The embassy acknowledged its close involvement in the 
negotiations from the start of the bidding, arguing that it ‘provided advocacy 
support at every stage of the process by pressing the Government to follow its 
own procedures under [its] Privatization Law’ (Wikileaks, 19 January 2006: 
06SOFIA80), and aside from the obvious economic benefits for the American 
industry to have a stake in Boyana, the intensity of the embassy’s lobbying was 
also a response to the State Department’s desire to expand its influence in the 
region. This interest in Bulgaria was dictated by the American view of the country 
as a strategic territory, demonstrated by then US Secretary of State Condoleeza 
Rice signing a Defense Cooperation Agreement between the US and Bulgaria in 
April 2006, which established four Bulgarian-American Joint Military Facilities in 
the country (Rice, 2006). This engagement, and the presence and interest of the 
Secretary of State, increased the pressure on Beyrle to complete the Boyana 
deal swiftly, and by July 2006 he had met with Bulgarian President Georgi 
Parvanov to discuss what he believed to be the country’s prohibitive business 
culture, once more mentioning the ‘long battle to conclude the privatization of the 
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Boyana Film Studio as a conspicuous bad example in this regard’ (Wikileaks, 3 
July 2006: 06SOFIA918). At the meeting’s conclusion, he had secured an 
agreement that Parvanov would ‘check on the state of play of the “notorious” 
Boyana deal’ (Wikileaks, 3 July 2006: 06SOFIA918), and four months later 95% 
of Boyana Studio’s shares were transferred to Nu Image. Beyrle regarded the 
completion of the deal as the result of ‘sustained embassy pressure in the face of 
strong-arm tactics from special interests’ (Wikileaks, 17 November 2006: 
06SOFIA1575), and it is no surprise that a few years later, a board member of Nu 
Image, Dimitar Dereliev, would be recorded in an embassy cable as being 
‘committed to forging a cooperative relationship with industry and the US 
government to address IPR concerns’ (Wikileaks, 26 October 2009: 
09SOFIA603), cementing the US ‘piracy’ agenda into Boyana’s business culture. 
 
Post-Bush 
After the election of Barack Obama in 2008, there was a subtle, but distinct 
change in the nature of the correspondence between the embassies and the US 
State Department. With the US government’s defence strategy moving towards 
withdrawal from its major military endeavors, the cables depict a subtler 
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approach to its soft power initiatives in its strategically important regions, 
especially the Middle East. Interestingly, several accounts recorded in the cables 
suggest that this ‘softening’ of international relations was often a two-way 
process, such as in Iran, where the US had begun soliciting views from local 
filmmakers. The director Gholam Reza Siamizadeh described to the Baku 
embassy how Hollywood films were ‘very popular’ locally, and stated that while 
most were not shown in Iranian cinemas, they were widely available on DVD 
(Wikileaks, 4 March 2009: 09BAKU172). In addition, he asserted, ‘80-90 per cent 
of the Iranian people have no problem with America’, and they had a ‘good 
feeling’ about Obama (Wikileaks, 4 March 2009: 09BAKU172). 
 
Likewise, cables from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia depict a country that was gradually 
becoming more receptive to an increase in the number of American programmes 
that were beginning to feature on Saudi TV networks, and the cultural changes 
that were perceived to be resulting from this. Chargé d’Affaires David Rundell 
recounted meetings with Saudi industry contacts, who argued that ‘the American 
programming on Channels 4 and 5 were proving the most popular among 
Saudis’, with Arabic subtitled versions of The Late Show With David Letterman 
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(CBS, 1993-2015), Desperate Housewives (ABC, 2004-2012) and Friends (NBC, 
1994-2004) amongst the most popular programs (Wikileaks, 11 May 2009: 
09RIYADH651). One of Rundell’s contacts suggested that this was part of a 
general Westernization in ‘remote, conservative corners of the country’, where 
‘you no longer see Bedouins, but kids in western dress’ (Wikileaks, 11 May 2009: 
09RIYADH651). Other notable mentions were given to the films Michael Clayton 
(Tony Gilroy, US, 2007), for its illustration of ‘heroic honesty in the face of 
corruption’, and Insomnia (Christopher Nolan, US, 2002), for the depiction of 
‘respect for the law over self-interest’ (Wikileaks, 11 May 2009: 09RIYADH651). 
However, in Rundell’s estimation, what was important was not the content of 
these films, but the fact that these types of commercial productions were 
penetrating the Saudi market much more effectively than existing US 
government-funded broadcasting, including its Arabic-language news channel 
Alhurra, formed in 2004. As another of Rundell’s contacts would elaborate: 
 
It’s still all about the War of Ideas [sic] here, and the American 
programming on MBC [Middle East Broadcasting Center] and 
Rotana is winning over ordinary Saudis in a way that ‘Al Hurra’  
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[sic] and other US propaganda never could. Saudis… are 
fascinated by US culture in a way they never were before 
(Wikileaks, 11 May 2009: 09RIYADH651). 
 
According to this contact, the proliferation of American programmes and movies 
led many Saudis to believe that there was a direct intervention by the US 
government in all of the country’s television broadcasting, a suspicion 
exacerbated by the existence of Alhurra. Likewise, it was commonly believed that 
Rupert Murdoch’s relationship with Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal, Saudi royal family 
member and the main shareholder of the Rotana media group (which broadcasts 
Fox and Fox Movies in Saudi Arabia), had a ‘clear ideological motive behind it’ 
(Wikileaks, 11 May 2009: 09RIYADH651). While Rundell viewed their 
relationship as more of an economic than an ideological proposition, he 
recounted the screening of two films during the Eid holiday on the free-to-air Fox 
Movie Channel, which depicted ‘respectful, supportive American husbands’, and 
argued that these depictions were helping to have a ‘profound effect on the 
values and worldviews of Saudi audiences’ (Wikileaks, 11 May 2009: 
09RIYADH651). It is clear from the Riyadh cables that the embassy believed that 
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market forces were leading to a gradual penetration of American culture into the 
public consciousness, if this at present only manifested in changes in the way 
that some people dressed, rather than any hard evidence that suggested a wider 
change in attitude or customs. 
 
Conclusion 
Film producer Walter Wanger called American films ‘ambassadors’ (Swann, 
1991: 2) for the United States, and it is no surprise that these cultural exports 
would go hand in hand with their literal governmental counterparts. As Paul 
Swann observed of the immediate post-Second World War period, ‘it is very easy 
to portray a situation of cozy collusion between the film industry and the US State 
Department’ (Swann, 1991: 5), and the Wikileaks cables certainly support the 
notion that the State Department and its network of international embassies were 
intimately involved with Hollywood during the early 21st-century. However, the 
cables also speak of the nature of American power in the early 21st-century. 
Douglas Kellner argues that ‘the intersection of film and politics during the Bush-
Cheney era documents the end of an era of American unilateralism and 
imperialism and the collapse of the Republican Party administration and its 
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rightwing supporters’ imperial dreams’ (Kellner, 2010: 258). But the evidence 
presented by these documents suggests the opposite conclusion; namely that 
American ‘imperialism’ was alive and well during this period, with Hollywood 
providing an ideal example of what de Grazia defines as America’s ‘market 
empire’. 
 
But what is most striking about American power in the 21st-century, is that its 
expression is increasingly clandestine. Whether ‘hard’, ‘soft’ or ‘smart’, current 
conceptions of American power are all predicated on being public - for without a 
public expression and awareness of these powers, they cannot be exerted with 
any potency. On the contrary, the activities depicted by the tranche of Wikileaks 
documents reveals an approach that was in essence clandestine, conducted by 
embassies away from the public gaze. While a detailed theoretical exploration of 
the nature of this power is beyond the scope of this paper, the cables make it 
evident that the covert support provided by US embassies was less an 
expression of ‘soft’ or even ‘smart’ power, but of a distinctly surreptitious power 
that was deployed with abandon, and without scrutiny, and grew in 
pervasiveness during the Bush administration. It appears that there was a subtler 
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approach to the use of this power after Obama’s election as President, and one 
can only speculate as to the interventions that have taken place in the years 
since the cache of leaked cables was published. It is the role of future papers to 
investigate how some of the issues identified by the Wikileaks releases have 
developed since 2010, and how the new dimension to American power that they 
suggest can be theorized further. However, in a decade in which American 
values and interests appear to be under even greater threat, it is likely that the 
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Notes 
i The first payment to Britain as part of the Marshall plan was made in April 1948. 
ii Joseph Nye had also used the phrase ‘smart power’ in his book of the same 
year, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, but Nossel’s article 
was the first to articulate this approach as a distinctive development of ‘soft’ 
power (Nye, 2004c). 
iii Cablegate has now been subsumed into the main Wikileaks website, but the 
embassy cables can now be searched at https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/.  
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iv See for example, Zhejiang Province Communist Party Secretary Xi Jinping’s 
assertion of his love of American cinema to US Ambassador Clark T Randt Jr in 
2007 (Wikileaks, 19 March 2007: 07BEIJING1840). 
v See http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2013SPEC301HISTORICALCHART.pdf for a full 
list of countries that have been placed on the Special 301 list since 1989. Copies 
of each report from 1989 onwards can be found at 
http://keionline.org/ustr/special301. 
vi The film was a depiction of the Nanjing massacre and was controversial for 
portraying the event through the eyes of a sympathetic Japanese soldier 
(Wikileaks, 12 June 2009: 09SHANGHAI258). 
